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Abstract: The aim of this contribution is to exhibit the operational nature of the Austrian analyses of institutions,
particularly those of Lachmann (1994; 1986; 1978; 1977; 1976; 1970). The first section briefly discuss the main
features of the Austrian analysis of the market process with the aim of highlighting the necessary irruption of the
institutional component. The second section aims at exhibiting the particularities of the Lachmannian analysis of
institutional change. The third section proposes to make use of the Lachmannian analytical framework in order
to interpret the contemporary transformations of the market economies. I particularly show the great benefit of
such a framework in order to, on one side, offer some explanations of the recent financial crisis faced by the
emerging economies, and on the other side, to understand the specificity as well as the coherence of the Chinese
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Résumé: L’objet de cette contribution est de faire ressortir le caractère opérationnel des analyses autrichiennes
des institutions au premier titre desquelles celle de Lachmann (1994 ; 1986 ; 1979 ; 1976 ; 1970).  La première
section de notre travail revient sur la statut de la variable institutionnelle au sein des analyses autrichiennes des
processus de marché. La seconde section vise à faire apparaître les particularités de l’analyse économique du
changement institutionnel proposée par Lachmann, d’une part au regard de ce qu’il est convenu d’appeler la
théorie autrichienne des institutions et des processus de marché, et d’autre part eu égard aux approches
institutionalistes. La troisième section propose d’utiliser les catégories analytiques mises au jour par Lachmann
dans une perspective d’interprétation des transformations contemporaines des économies de marché. Nous
montrons en particulier tout l’intérêt de ces catégories analytiques dans l’objectif d’une part, de comprendre la
spécificité et la cohérence de la transition de l’économie chinoise, et d’autre part d’apporter quelques éléments
d’explication à la crise financière récente des économies émergentes.
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The Austrian theory of institutions shows the particularity of being tied into a market
process analysis. Since institutions are used to explain the transmission of information and
knowledge, which is integrated in the formation and revision of plans, they represent the ‘key
link’ that makes it possible to complete the reasoning chain of the Austrian theory about
market processes (O’Driscoll, Rizzo, 1996).
But if such a specificity gave rise to a great number of analytical as well as methodological
or epistemological contributions, its empirical dimension has been neglected to the benefit of
the Institutional works. This statement is particularly injurious as the Austrian approach of
institutions, being rooted into a general theory of market processes, has a priori an aptitude to
propound an institutional change analysis of (towards) the market economies.
The aim of my contribution is to come back to this untapped potential in order to exhibit
the operational nature of the Austrian analyses of institutions, particularly those of Lachmann
(1994; 1986; 1978; 1977; 1976; 1970). The first section briefly discuss the main features of
the Austrian analysis of the market process with the aim of highlighting the necessary
irruption of the institutional component. The second section aims at exhibiting the
particularities of the Lachmannian analysis of institutional change. The third section proposes
to make use of the Lachmannian analytical framework in order to interpret the contemporary
transformations of the market economies. I particularly show the great benefit of such a
framework in order to, on one side, offer some explanations of the recent financial crisis faced
by the emerging economies, and on the other side, to understand the specificity as well as the
coherence of the Chinese economic transition.
1. Information, knowledge and the co-ordination of individual plans : the
institutions as points of orientation.
Presenting the intent of his 1986's book, The Market as an Economic Process, Lachmann
explains: « The central idea of this book is the market regarded as an economic process, that
is, an ongoing process, impelled by the diversity of aims and resources and the divergence of
expectations, ever changing in a world of unexpected change » (1986, p. x). My purpose here
is to come back to the main features of this very particular conception of the market regarded
as a process in order to highlight the role played by the institutional variable
1.
                                                          
1 For a more circumstantial presentation of the Austrian concept of the market process see Dulbecco, Dutraive
(2000).1.1. The processual nature of economic phenomena
The first feature relates to the dismissal of the notion of atemporal equilibrium
2. Such
dismissal represents, as everyone knows, one of the most obvious features of Austrian
economics. By rejecting the concept of atemporal equilibrium, the Austrian school rejects the
possibility of an objective knowledge of economic phenomena. The outcomes of the running
of the market system cannot be objectively known, the adjustment process being likely to take
on various forms which reflect the modes of interaction between individual plans. Markets are
then best regarded as processes.
The concept of process consists of two distinct elements ( Ioannides, 1992): (1) the
principle of  endogeneity which states that all economic processes are endogenously
mobilised, and (2) time, underlining the fact that ‘the sequence of events becomes an issue of
fundamental importance, as each event really constitutes the cause of the one succeeding it’
(ibid., p.9). Finally ‘the outcomes of market depend on what happens at their various stages
and on the order in which events happen. This means in particular that antecedents will
influence subsequent events in so far as acting men attribute significance to them and that
therefore the order in which events happen matters’ (Lachmann, 1986, p.4).
However the rejection of the state of equilibrium doesn't necessarily mean the rejection of
the concept of equilibrium itself. First of all, because the idea of an individual equilibrium
which implies that all aspects of an individual plan are compatible with each other is assumed,
in the Austrian tradition, to hold a priori, even if the maintenance of such equilibrium over
time requires that the data generated by the economy does not disrupt the agent's expectations.
Second, because the traditional Austrian theory of market processes
3 does not rule out the idea
of a trend towards a market equilibrium. On the contrary, there exists between Lachmann's
view of the fundamental indeterminateness of the market process and Mises's belief in the a
priori nature of the tendency toward equilibrium, a wide range of positions, which are not
really inconsistent with the notion of equilibrium. The Hayekian and the Kirznerian stands
are, in this point of view, representative of the place and the role assigned by this traditional
Austrian theory to the notion of equilibrium. Whereas for  Hayek (1937) the degree of
indeterminateness of the market equilibrium viewed as the outcome of the interaction of
several minds functioning independently from each other is removed by the empirical
                                                          
2 That is ‘an equilibrium in which economic actions at a particular point in time are co-ordinated independent of
what transpired just before that instant and what may transpire just after’ (Garrison 1986, p.89).
3 The ‘traditional’ Austrian theory of the market process refers to the contributions of Hayek, Mises, Kirzner and
Lachmann.convergence of expectations, the entrepreneur is the one who, according to Kirzner (1973;
1979; 1985; 1992), acts as the stabilising force and leads to the adjustment of the market
process towards equilibrium, by discovering and cancelling market errors, that is by
exploiting profit opportunities.
Nowadays, the idea of a trend towards equilibrium is however widely criticised within the
Austrian family itself (O’Driscoll, Rizzo, 1996) (Boettke, Horwitz, Prychitko, 1994)
4. The
important point here is that the recognition of the importance of disequilibrating forces goes
together with another feature of modern Austrian economics, that is with a greater attention
given to the prerequisites for equilibrating behaviour. As soon as the  disequilibrating
tendencies in markets are not simply the result of changes in the exogenous data, but arise
from the source of equilibrating behaviour (the indeterminate response to perceived profit
opportunities), it becomes necessary to discover the co-operating conditions that are needed to
make equilibration more or less likely (O'Driscoll, Rizzo 1996, p.xxi). In other words, the
problem is to determine the ordering principles which produce mutually reinforcing sets of
expectations without denying that some expectations will be wrong ( Boettke,  Horwitz,
Prychitko 1994)
5. Such ordering principles will assume different forms in different markets,
depending on what Lachmann (1986) calls the proximity of agents and their range of action.
The concept of pattern co-ordination proposed by O'Driscoll and Rizzo (1996) makes it
possible to incorporate this dynamic character of the notion of market process, thus providing
a solution to the problem of identifying ordering principles. Based on the distinction between
typical and unique events
6, the pattern co-ordination analysis indicates that if the market is
able to co-ordinate typical events and consequently to stabilise the economy, it is no more the
case when the unique characteristics of human actions are taken into account. Indeed in this
last case the market process becomes entirely indeterminate and the co-ordination of plans
needs alternative co-ordination mechanisms. It is here important to notice that this analysis is
general, insofar as it can deal with the numerous Austrian approaches of market process, the
convergence towards equilibrium being a very particular occurrence in which identical events
are repeated period after period.
                                                          
4 Of course, Kirzner does not share this position.
5 Let us remember that ‘The concept of order (...) has the advantage that we can meaningfully speak about an
order being approached to various degrees, and that order can be preserved throughout a process of change.
While an economic equilibrium never really exists, there is some justifications for asserting that the kind of order
of which our theory describes an ideal type, is approached in a high degree’ (Hayek 1978, p.184).
6 Typical events are events, that an observer perceives as being repeated regularly, as long as the process itself is
being repeated. Unique events are the ones that occur only once and are thus time dependent; they can never be
discovered (O'Driscoll, Rizzo 1996).Market processes cannot then be understood, from an Austrian perspective, with an
atemporal equilibrium analytical apparatus. The meaning of equilibrium is a question of
ordering principle and pattern of co-ordination, both of which harmonise and secure the
agents' expectations. In other words, equilibrium does not primarily depend on prices, but on
expectations, information systems, and the interpretative frameworks which are used by
economic agents (Loasby, 1991).
1.2. The creative character of human action
A second important feature of the Austrian approach regarding the analysis of the
operation of markets, lies in the fact that it take into account the active behaviour of economic
agents. This point is related to the recognition of the ignorance and uncertainty faced by
market agents as well as to the essential complexity of the market.
The conception of the market as a system in constant flux where the flow of information is
the moving force of economic activity assume that ignorance and uncertainty will surround
most market decisions. The Austrian School's method of incorporating ignorance, uncertainty,
and expectations into economic theory has been to stress the entrepreneurial element in
human consciousness.  Entrepreneurship theory indeed offers an answer to two important
questions raised by the analysis of market processes (Ioannides, 1992): (1) the question of
describing the motives that mobilise the use of knowledge, and (2) the question of the (exact)
way this behaviour is expressed in the market process. More precisely, it is possible to
distinguish two types of answers which refer to two types of active behaviours, each one
referring to the distinction previously pointed out between equilibrium market processes and
indeterminate market processes (Boettke, Horwitz, Prychitko 1994).
The first type of behaviour is more particularly associated with Kirzner’s work (1973;
1979; 1985; 1992). Indeed as it is well known, Kirzner defends the idea that the market
economy opens up arbitrage possibilities because of the ignorance of individuals: finding a
good that sells for different prices in the market is the most obvious example, but Kirzner
believes that the discovery of factors of production that can be transformed into consumer
goods can also be considered as an arbitrage if factor prices are lower than the price of the
consumer good. The essence of the entrepreneurial behaviour is thus the discovery of profit
opportunities. It is however important to notice that if such an entrepreneurial activity is a
product of market  disequilibrium, its character is by definition equilibrating since takingadvantage of a profit opportunity is equivalent to cancelling it. The  discovery-arbitrage
behaviour represents a force that constantly pushes the market toward equilibrium.
This first kind of active behaviour is however considered as too poor, that is too
mechanical, by the Austrian analyses which would rather adopt a Lachmannian reasoning
7.
Boettke, Horwitz and Prychitko thus explain that: ‘Austrians have traditionally postulated a
world of Robbinsian maximisers, and allowed the entrepreneur to seek arbitrage opportunities
which equilibrate the market. Such an entrepreneur need only exercise alertness to profit
opportunities. But entrepreneurship is also characterised by judgements about imagined future
opportunities’ (1994, p.65). The problem is hence to focus on the  Lachmannian  creative
dimension of entrepreneurial behaviour: the creative agent builds plans upon her imagination
of the future whereas the discoverer elaborates plans exclusively on the basis of the
knowledge at her disposal (Gloria, 1996, p.8). However, when the role of judgement is added
to alertness, expectations are granted full force and the satisfaction of some individuals'
expectations can come only at the expense of the disappointment of others (Lachmann, 1986).
The consequence of this is that the market is now described as a process characterised by
unexpected change and inconsistency of plans, incompatible with a systematic tendency
toward equilibrium.
It now seems obvious that the Austrian analyses contributed to rehabilitate the individuals
behaviours related to the coordination issue; economics is a praxeologic science, as Ludwig
von Mises would state
8. The agent is seen as a true actor (Langlois, 1986) with an active and
creative behaviour turned toward an uncertain, unpredictable and widely indeterminate future.
This aptitude which stems from an extension of individualism to subjectivism carries out a
behavioural analysis dealing with learning, adapting and acquiring the knowledge needed to
face the complexity and uncertainty linked to economic action.
This last comment introduces the key role played by institutions with the aim of
articulating the main elements of a market processes analysis which takes place in the
economics of time and ignorance ( O'Driscoll,  Rizzo 1996). Indeed, when the future is
unknowable, the expectations divergent and the discoordination forces as strong as those of
                                                          
7  That is, a reasoning which tries to take into account the subjective character of both anticipations and
knowledge (Lachmann, 1976).
8 Let us remember  that ‘praxeology rests on the fundamental axiom that individual human beings act, that is, on
the primordial fact that individuals engage in conscious actions toward chosen goals. This concept of action
contrasts to purely reflexive, or knee-jerk, behaviour, which is not directed toward goals’ (Rothbard, 1976, p.19).co-ordination, social institutions may enter the picture in order to align expectations and by so
doing, they become part of a theory of plans co-ordination.
1.3. The necessary irruption of the institutional component
It is unanimously recognised that institutions are, in an Austrian approach, of great
influence to explain the market process
9. In this respect,  Lachmann’s argument is
representative: “It would be wrong to think that a market economy, when faced with the
problems just outlined, could, or in the ordinary course of events would, find no answer to
them. History shows that whenever left sufficiently free from political interference to evolve
its response to such challenges, the market economy has ‘grown’ the institutions necessary to
deal with them” (Lachmann 1978, p.67).
The whole set of formulating concepts used to deal with social institutions, relies basically
on the notion of rule-following behaviour (Langlois, 1993, p.166): institutions are roughly
regularities of behaviour understandable in terms of rules, norms and routines (Nelson, Winter
1982). According to Schotter, the definition of a social institution can be drawn from an
Austrian perspective as ‘a regularity in social behaviour that is agreed to by all members of
society, specifies behaviour in specific recurrent situations and is either self-policed or policed
by some external authority’ (1981, p.11). Institutions are the means by which agents are able
to gather sufficient information in order to co-operate. In a word, institutions save knowledge
and information
10 (Lachmann, 1970). Institutions then consist of general or enduring pieces of
knowledge (O’Driscoll, Rizzo, 1996, p.xxii) which provide ‘points of orientation’ likely to
make actions and expectations relatively compatible (Lachmann, 1970)
11. Any practice that
allows individual goals to be reached spreads until it becomes an institution.
The peculiar status granted to the institution within the Austrian framework seems clearer
now: since institutions are used to explain the transmission of information and knowledge,
which is integrated in the formation and revision of plans, they represent the ‘key link’ that
makes it possible to complete the reasoning chain of the Austrian theory about market
                                                          
9 See for example the new introduction of the second edition of O’Driscoll and Rizzo’s book (1996, p.xxii); see
also Garrouste (1995; 1994) and the contributions in Boettke and Prychitko (eds) (1994). It is the very same
motive which induces Langlois to state that ‘Menger has perhaps more claim to be the patron saint of the New
Institutional Economics than has any of the original Institutionalists’ (Langlois, 1986, p.5).
10 The role of institutions in reducing information costs is outlined by the game-theory approach through such
notions as ‘convention’ (co-ordination game) or ‘norm’ (prisoners’ dilemma game) (Schotter, 1994).processes. O’Driscoll and Rizzo indeed indicate that: “Rules provide, as it were, safe bounds
for behaviour in a relatively unbounded world. Institutions are the social crystallisation of
rule-following behaviour or, in other words, the overall pattern of many individuals following
a similar rule (...). Thus, the circle is closed. Time and genuine uncertainty promote the
following of rules and the development of institutions. The latter, in turn, serve to reduce, but
not eliminate, the unboundness of the economic system by providing the stable patterns of
interaction” (1996, p. 6). Of course, the overall demonstration supposes that the knowledge
spread by institutions is stabilising (in the sense that it constantly reaffirms the stability of the
social framework) whereas the one dispersed by the price system is of a dynamic nature (in
the sense that it leads individuals to a continuous revision of their plans) (Hayek, 1945).
An endogenous explanation about the dynamics of institutions is however required in order
to loop the loop. Indeed, if institutions act as signposts in a world of uncertainty, what we
need is a theory of plan co-ordination, which integrates the fact that, not only do social
institutions serve to align expectations, they may also deal successfully with the forces of
change. It would otherwise be difficult to concede that the institutional element achieving
completion of the analysis of the dynamic functioning of market processes will be the only
one outside these dynamics. It is then a matter of assessing the Austrian representation in
relation to its capacity for producing an analysis of the evolution of institutions within a
market economy.
2. Market process and institutional change: the permanency  versus
flexibility dilemma
Such analysis must allow solving three types of problems (Lachmann, 1970, pp.51-52).
Firstly, there is the problem of institutional change and how to reconcile the idea of an
institutional change with that of an institution as a ‘point of orientation’, which assumes its
fixity. Secondly, the issue of the institutional order and its unity is formulated: if the
complementarity of institutions builds the institutional order of a society, the purpose is then
to identify the forces of integration as well as the circumstances under which these forces
cease to work. Finally, there is the question of the rise of new institutions that is to underline
the requirements needed for new institutions to fit into the existing structure. Solving these
                                                                                                                                                                                    
11 ‘An institution provides means of orientation to a large number of actors. It enables them to co-ordinate
actions by means of orientation to a common signpost’ ( Lachmann, 1970, p.45). The so-called concept of
‘orientation points’ expresses the idea of a decreasing instead of an elimination of uncertainty (Lachmann, 1994).three kinds of problems comes down to providing a solution to what we have agreed to call
the permanency-flexibility dilemma: ‘If institutions are to remove uncertainty, they must be
permanent. But if they are to be shaped by market forces they must be flexible. How, within
the institutional order of modern market society, is this problem resolved?’ (Lachmann, 1994,
p.50).
Although there is no place for the evolution of institutions within Menger’s conception, the
analysis of change is, on the contrary, an essential aspect of Hayek’s approach to institutions
(Garrouste, 1994; 1998). The latter holds in the idea mentioned above which implies that
institutions embody efficient adaptation modes according to the environment. This means that
institutions with inferior survival properties are removed by means of a selection mechanism.
Besides the fact that in Hayek’s analysis an imprecision is found through the definition of the
selection criterion ( Garrouste, 1994, p.863), as well as through the explanation of those
survival properties ( O’Driscoll,  Rizzo, 1996, p.40), such discussion of the dynamics of
institutions cannot hold if the existing complementarity
12 of institutions within an institutional
order ( Lachmann 1970) is taken into consideration. The routine courses of action that
comprise institutions are indeed not all independent. Some truly inferior routines must be
maintained in order to permit the existence of those that are actually superior: ‘The
implication of these considerations is that, in the absence of a clear conception of the nature of
survival properties, we cannot know whether any given institution or course of action is the
most adaptative’ (O’Driscoll, Rizzo, 1996, p.40).
Lachmann’s interpretation of the dynamics of institutions holds a distinctive place within
the Austrian approach. Besides the fact that it claims to go back to a logic much more rooted
in a Weberian discourse than in a Mengerian one, its main purpose consists in drawing the
conditions for the attainment of both coherence and permanence of the institutional order, that
is to deal with the accurate issue of complementarity
13.
The overall demonstration is based on the distinction made by the author between ‘legal
norms’ or ‘designed institutions’ which are ‘the products of legislation and other
manifestations of the “social will”’ (Lachmann 1970, p.69) and the ‘recurrent patterns of
conduct which we call institutions’ (ibid., p.75) or ‘undesigned institutions’
14. But, following
Lachmann’s logic, if, on the one hand, all institutions do not take on the same status and
                                                          
12 O’Driscoll and Rizzo use the term indivisibility (1996).
13 We do not however introduce the analysis about coherence.
14 One may recognise here the Mengerian distinction between pragmatic and organic institutions.function
15, they share, on the other hand, the flexibility property linked to the permanency of
the whole.
The matter that now arises is how to make institutional change and structural permanence
compatible, since it is not so much the change per se which brings up roblems here but rather
unexpected change
16. A much more harmful outcome from the occurrence of this kind of
unpredictable change concerns the relationship between designed and undesigned institutions.
Indeed, as institutions can only be indeed designed to face specific well-known situations ‘the
unexpected change of undesigned institutions may not merely jeopardise the coherence of the
institutional structure as a whole, but in addition may obviate the very design of the designed
institutions’ (ibid., p.80).
The solution put forward by Lachmann in order to cope with this last kind of problem
consists in setting up designed institutions which allow to integrate change without altering
the institutional structure as a whole. The notion of  interstices within the legal order
represents here a key component for the institutional dynamics: ‘the undesigned institutions
which evolve gradually as the unintended and unforeseeable result of the pursuit of individual
interests accumulate in the interstices of the legal order’ (ibid., p.81). The function of those
interstices is actually to lead to the accumulation of sediments coming from the evolution of
undesigned institutions so that the coherence of the whole remains. Hence, according to
Lachmann, if a society is fundamentally made of two types of institutions, the external ones
which constitute the outer framework of the society and the internal ones, which gradually
evolve as a result of market processes, the institutional dynamics however arise from the
specificity of those interstices, shared by both kind of institutions.
Such understanding of the institutional dynamics therefore requires various comments
17.
The proposed pattern stems from the assumption that only the undesigned institutions evolve.
But designed institutions also change. The analysis of the institutional dynamics then requires
to consider two emerging issues: the first one is related to the structural change of designed
institutions and the second is linked to the relationship existing between the changes in the
legal order and the evolution of undesigned institutions. In other respects, it is possible that
the coherence and permanence of the current social order would be jeopardised even without
change in the legal system. It is particularly the case when the slow evolution of institutions
                                                          
15 Some are more fundamental than others in the sense that they are basic institutions of market society: ‘They
must exist before there can be markets which function smoothly’ (Lachmann, 1994, p.50).
16 Only the last type of change is likely to upset some plans in the course of actions.
17 Lachmann himself has first suggested these remarks.extends beyond the interstices of an existing social and legal order, leading to what Lachmann
has called as ‘deformation of social space’ (ibid., p.83).
It is this type of problem, which has substantial implications in formulating an overall
representation of the dynamics of institutional change, that one meets when studying the
development mechanisms of market economies.
3. The institutions and the development of the market
The point here is to insist on one of the most important implications of the processual
concept of the market, that is the one related to the complementary nature of the different
forms of co-ordination. Indeed, if the analytical framework presented above permits us to take
into account such a complementarity, an empirical investigation should offer the opportunity
to demonstrate that this relationship represents a key element in the development process of
any market economy. This is, in any case, what we have demonstrated through an analysis of
the institutional dimension of the financial crisis in emerging economies, as well as through
an examination of the role played by decentralisation in the adoption of the market
mechanisms in China.
3.1. Financial liberalisation and stability of the financial system in emerging markets :
the institutional dimension of financial crises
18
Since the late 80s, emerging economies
19 have begun a process of financial liberalisation,
which is reminiscent of that experienced by a number of industrialised countries since the end
of the 70s. However the process of financial liberalisation in emerging markets takes place in
a context of significant growth in the number of banking crises
20. It is in this perspective
possible to interpret the instability associated with the employed reforms since the end of the
                                                          
18 This section is based on Allegret, Dulbecco (1999).
19 By emerging economies, we mean developing countries, which have experienced a financial deepening, and
significant capital inflows since the mid 80's thanks to significant financial reforms. According to the Institute of
International Finance, 29 countries are concerned : in the Asian-Pacific region (China, South Korea, India,
Indonesia, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela) ; in Europe (Bulgaria, Russian Federation, Hungary, Poland, the Czech
Republic, Romania, Slovakia, Turkey) ; in Africa (South Africa, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia). Despite the
diversity in both economic positions and economic systems adopted in the past, these emerging markets all
experience a common problem of institutional transformations in their financial systems – in particular, in their
systems of banking intermediation - in the sense of a marketisation in this system of intermediation.
20 Thus, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) – studying 20 countries between 1970 and mid 1995 – identify a rupture
concerning the frequency of banking crises between 1980 and 1990 and previous decades. More recently,80s, in terms of an alternative between liberalisation excess and insufficiency. Such
interpretation leads to call into question, if not the principle, then the rhythm or intensity of
the financial liberalisation. Our analysis is different. We develop the idea that the answer to
financial instability must be sought in institutional dynamics. This involves going beyond the
intermediation/market opposition, in which emerging economies would use the advantages of
an intermediated system to reinforce the market process.
The Complementary nature of the relationship intermediation-market
Empirical works relative to banking crises identifies the channels of transmission, through
which financial liberalisation may exert an influence on banking stability. Firstly, and
conforming to the effects anticipated by financial repression theories ( McKinnon, 1973),
interest rate deregulation seems to go together with an increase in the level of interest rates.
Secondly, financial liberalisation is accompanied by the opening of the financial system. For
the banks, the opening of the financial system has the effect of offering the possibility of
raising funds in foreign stock markets: it is the currency mismatch phenomenon, in which the
credits granted are secured with short term currency commitments. This phenomenon is a
weakening factor in the case of capital outflows. Thirdly, the deregulation of bank loans leads
to a rapid rise in the number of commercial bank loans granted to the private sector. If we
accept the idea that commercial banks behave under conditions of moral hazard, we must
consider that they demonstrate exaggerated optimism regarding future growth, and thus
extend credit beyond its optimal level.
The consideration of all precedent elements thus leads authors such as McKinnon and Pill
(1998) to highlight the inadequacies of the Washington Consensus (1996), which makes
economic liberalisation the indispensable condition of world growth. Indeed, according to the
authors, the liberalisation process underlying this consensus underestimates the need to invest
in the institutional infrastructure before introducing financial reforms. Stiglitz (1998a, 1998b)
points out in the same perspective that the emerging economies have regulation capacities
inferior to those of the developed countries. Therefore, they are particularly vulnerable to
shocks after financial opening, which could justify the permanence of state intervention in the
financial sector. From this point of view, one may interpret the increase in banking crises in
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) identified a relationship between financial liberalisation and financial
fragility.the emerging markets as the result of excess financial liberalisation, when taking into account
an inadequate institutional infrastructure.
If we now agree to revalue the institutional dimension in the explanation of emerging
countries’ financial crises, we must still make use of an analytical structure in order to
understand why financial institutions are a necessary complement to markets. The latter only
being imperfect substitutes to financial institutions. The analysis of the dynamics of the
market processes presented above, centred on the complementarity between institutions and
markets, should permit us to study the conditions in which new institutions are likely to
become successfully part of the existing institution structure, turning to good account the
coexistence of intermediation and the market.
In the field of financial markets and financial asset markets, financial intermediaries are
institutions, which reduce uncertainty. The main argument is that financial intermediaries in
charge of selecting and monitoring investment projects appear to produce information under
information asymmetry. The important point is that, with respect to the market relation, the
existence of repeated contracts between the lending financial intermediaries and the
borrowing agents makes it possible to accumulate knowledge which can be used across the
whole economic system. Then as financial intermediaries participate in the functioning of the
market process, by producing information, we consider as irrelevant the opposition between
intermediation and the market, which is proposed by the informational approach on the basis
of the advantages of the former over the latter
21. Financial intermediaries are dominant agents
of the market process, which underlines their intrinsic connection with the market.
Financial liberalisation and intermediation : the dilemma of emerging economies
In an evolutionary perspective, processes of liberalisation may be understood as a special
step in the development of a market economy, i.e. that of emergence within an old system.
The relevant question is more how markets develop and evolve over time, rather than the
conditions required for a successful adoption of the market mechanism. The institutional
dimension has a critical role to play in this perspective. The idea is that the institutional
structure, which prevails at a given moment in an economy, may encourage or hinder the
liberalisation process, according to its capacity to integrate new elements.
                                                          
21 On this point, see Hellwig (1989 ; 1990) and Von Thadden (1990).Indeed, all economies which have chosen a process of liberalisation, face the problem of
institutional change. It is thus necessary to render compatible the idea of institutional change
with that of the institution, understood as a permanent orientation point.  Although this
problem is not specific to emerging economies, it is posed for them in very particular terms.
There is an asymmetry between abandoning –rapidly destroying– previous institutions, and
adopting –slowly constructing– new ones. The consequences is that individuals incur the risk
of confronting, sometimes over long periods, with the lack of rules that enable them to co-
ordinate their plans efficiently. The adoption of market mechanisms thus shows a
deterioration in their positions.
Furthermore, one must take into account the fact that the adoption –the transfer–, just like
the creation of new institutions, is subject to delays: delays of implementation in the first case,
and delays of construction in the second. Yet, the amount of economic change possible per
unit of time is always limited, because agents have limited learning capacities. And once
again, this constraint is bigger in emerging economies. Let us consider for example the
adoption –the transfer– of market institutions. If it is always possible, in theory and in
practise, to imagine a situation in which an economic or political authority decides to
implement market institutions –for example through a process of financial liberalisation– the
benefits expected from this type of measure are a controversial issue. Indeed, inasmuch as
such a policy is, by definition, limited to designed institutions, its success depends on the
capacity of these new elements to meet the demand for change in institutions not yet
designed. The difficulty comes from the fact that, if the transformation of  designed
institutions is in general both radical and fast, that of  undesigned institutions is of an
incremental nature, and is necessarily subject to path dependence constraints. The reason is
that, apart from the fact that individuals only accept to subject themselves to changes in the
rules of the game when they find an interest, individual behaviour is the result of a cumulative
process of collective learning, which often started generations before.
Finally, arises the question of institutional order, and of its unity : if institutional order is
the product of the  complementarity of institutions, what are the integrating forces of
institutions, and under which circumstances are these forces over ? The analysis of the process
of liberalisation requires to specify the conditions of the coherence of institutional order,
because the system's components evolve at different speeds. The main implication is that the
transfer of the western economies’ formal economic rules towards the emerging economies
does in no way constitute a sufficient condition for achieving good economic performance.The solution to this problem is also the solution to what we call the permanency-flexibility
dilemma faced by the emerging economies
22. I’ve explained that the solution proposed by
Lachmann to solve this type of problem consists of implementing designed institutions, which
are likely to integrate the change without it affecting the institutional structure of the entirety.
The particular status of financial intermediation in the emerging markets then appears: the
financial intermediary, the commercial bank, represents indeed the main legal –designed–
institution, which authorises development of the contractual sphere –market development–
whilst guaranteeing coherence and permanence in the institutional order, necessary for the
carrying out of individual transactions.
By focusing on the institutional stakes of financial liberalisation, we know have four main
types of answers, aimed at taking into account a new financial context, marked by
liberalisation and banking instability. The first response consists of underlining the need for
accelerating liberalisation in the banking sector, notably by favouring the penetration of
foreign operators, in order to increase competition and allow transfers of know-how
(Goldstein and Turner, 1996). Secondly, international institutions also consider that the
appropriate way to ensure stable financial liberalisation is to increase the transparency of
financial operations, improve corporate governance in the emerging economies, and to ensure
adequate banking supervision (Group of Ten, 1996; IMF, 1997). Thirdly, McKinnon (1991)
and Johnston (1997, 1998) put forward what is called the sequential approach in financial
liberalisation: financial liberalisation must be part of a programme of macroeconomic and
microeconomic structural reforms. Finally, from a different view point, Singh (1998) and
Chang, Park and Yoo (1998) estimate that financial liberalisation in Asia led to destructive
competition and over-investment in companies, by removing the co-ordination methods used
by governments in economic decisions.
These different responses seem to omit an essential aspect of the changes which affect
emerging markets: institutional change underlying the process of financial liberalisation. This
raises the question of the resilience of financial systems in emerging economies, i.e. of their
capacity to change structurally while preserving their basic properties. Yet, in the emerging
economies, where asymmetric information is plenty, the problem faced by the authorities is
how to maintain an intermediated system compatible with growth in the market process. But,
as is underlined by Stiglitz (1998c), “building robust financial systems is a long and difficult
process”. Thus, beyond the debate concerning the validity of liberalisation, it is the financial
                                                          
22 One may recognize here the terms of the Lachmannian analysis.system's institutional architecture, based on the pre-eminence of financial  intermediation,
which is called into question in the emerging markets. If the role of the commercial banks
remains dominant in the financial systems of the emerging countries, it is not necessarily in
opposition with market development. This largely intermediated structure, is not in itself an
obstacle to financial liberalisation. On the contrary a successful transition depends on the
sudden emergence of market principles in banking intermediation.
It is in a very close perspective, that is by using the same analytical framework, that we
proposed to characterise the dynamics of the institutional change at work in the transition of
the Chinese economy.
3.2. The institutional change and the transition towards a market economy: the role of
decentralisation in Chinese economic reforms
23
The Chinese reform is so particular that one sometimes speaks of the Chinese model of
reform. This specificity has been explained by numerous analyses which insist on the smooth
view of the reforms as opposed to the big bang approach (shock therapy). In this way, authors
like Perkins (1994) or Liew (1995) use different arguments to discuss the gradualism thesis:
whereas for the former, gradualism reveals all the obstacles that stand between the partially
reformed Chinese economy of the early 1990s and a full market system, the latter considers
that gradualism, on the contrary, is associated with a strong central state who alone is able to
provide the conditions favourable to reform. In a very narrow perspective Sing (1993) defends
the idea of a step by step approach to Chinese reform, based on the notion of an optimal
combination of market mechanisms and planning. Still in the same line of thought, Jin and
Haynes (1997) use a dualist and leading sectoral approach to explain that China has used
some leading sectors in order to help the emergence of new elements of the market economy
while continuing to exploit the basic components of the old system, the whole contributing to
the maintenance of a relative stability of the economic and social framework
24. Finally Fan
(1994; 1996) characterises the Chinese model of reforms as a dual-track transition model,
thus underlining the rapid development of a new system alongside the old one, the latter being
momentarily preserved from any fundamental reforms.
                                                          
23 This section is based on Dulbecco, Renard (1999).
24  For  Jin and Hayes, the leading sectors that have successfully created positive  feedbacks for economic
transformation are the agricultural, service, and foreign trade and investment sectors (1997, p.86-91).Although such analyses help to characterise the Chinese model, they do not specifically
take into account the institutional element of the reforms. However the transition dynamics
cannot be analysed by reference to market criteria only; transition is, above all, a change in
institutions. Every transition economy thus faces the problem of creating a new institutional
framework which associates the co-ordination of activities by the market with the
preservation of a centralised mechanism of resource allocation. We explained that, in China,
this role is played by decentralisation. Indeed we demonstrated that Chinese economic
reforms, of which the main institutional vector is decentralisation, show the particularity of
reconciling, within one single logic, the permanency of a well-established institutional order
required for the co-ordination of individual plans, and the flexibility of institutions necessary
for the move towards the market.
Institutional change and economic reforms in transition economies
In any explanation of economic development as well as of the differential performance of
economies through time, the importance played by institutional change is hardly controversial
(North, 1990) (Lin, Nugent, 1995). Following this line of thought, a growing number of
works are today underlining the role played by institutional changes in transition economies
25.
I’ve explained that the main function assigned to institutions is to save knowledge and
information and consequently to make actions and expectations relatively compatible. If one
recognise here the ‘point orientation’ dimension of institutions it is also important to recall
that institutions are not always the result of an ex nihilo -or legal- creation process but also
arise because of the interactions of individuals. Institutions thus have a very ambiguous status:
not only do institutions constitute an external framework that removes uncertainty from
market transactions and consequently form the incentive structure of a society, they also
appear to be internal to individual transactions, the latter leading to their adjustment and
evolution. Any theory of economic change must consequently integrate the fact that, if
economic change shapes the institutional evolution of the economy - in the sense that
economic change is an incremental process resulting from the day-to-day choices of
individuals actors, - it also reflects the opportunities provided by what North (1994) has called
                                                          
25 See, for example, the numerous contributions to The Journal of Economic Issues, especially Adkins (1991),
Ostas (1992),  Koslowski (1992), Brown (1993), Elliot and  Dowlah (1993),  Schlack (1993),  Liew (1995),
Lichtenstein (1996)...the institutional matrix
26. In the case of a developed market economy, such a relationship
between economic change and institutional change is no longer problematic, since
institutional change may occur through gradual modifications, that is, by the alteration of
prevailing institutions. This is not the case, however, for transition economies which, by
definition, have chosen to reform their entire institutional framework.
More precisely, every transition economy must face three inter-related kinds of problem
27.
Firstly, there is the problem of institutional change and how to reconcile the idea of an
institutional change with that of an institution as "a point of orientation", which assumes its
fixity. The danger here is that a too-rapid process of transition may shift the comparative
advantage of governance structures to Mafia-like organisations rather than to market
institutions, the former preventing the effective emergence of efficient market institutions,
even in the long run
28. Secondly, the issue of institutional order and its unity is formulated.
Indeed as it is the  complementarity of institutions that builds the institutional order of a
society, analysing the transition of a planned economy to a market-oriented economy requires
that we specify the conditions for attaining the coherence of the institutional order
29, whereas
the parts of the system are evolving at divergent speeds. The efficiency criterion can hardly be
used, since "inefficient" institutions may always persist due to factors such as path
dependencies, technological  irreversibilities, political resistance to change, etc… There is
finally, and consequently, the matter of the adoption, the transfer, of new institutions, and
consequently the analysis of the conditions in which new institutions fit successfully into an
existing structure.
Solving these three kinds of problems comes down, here again, to resolving the
contradiction which exists between the necessity for the institutional order to be permanent
and coherent, and the necessity of flexibility. It is decentralisation that permitted China to
resolve such a contradiction; the permanent character in the Chinese economy of pre-existing
decentralised institutions indeed authorised governments to play the role of “points of
orientation” thus encouraging the development of the contractual sphere.
The decentralisation and the institutional dynamics of the reforms in China
                                                          
26 That is, "if the institutional framework rewards piracy then piratical organisations will come into existence;
and if the institutional framework rewards productive activities then organisations-firms-will come into existence
to engage in productive activities" (North, 1994, p.361).
27 One may once again recognize here the terms of the so-called Lachmannian analysis.
28 One may recognise here the case of Russia.Chinese Reforms began in 1978 with the choice of an incremental approach. One of the
main proposals was the development of agricultural and industrial activities out of the plan.
This experience is original because the search for a market economy does not imply the end
of the state. Chinese economy is still a mix of public, private and collective economy. The
role of the central state remains important, even if it appears to be less dominant than before.
Considering the size of the country, no one program can be discussed without taking into
account spatial considerations
30.  To understand the foundations and the evolution of the
reforms, one must consequently refer to the organisational dimension of the Chinese
economy. In China, there is a long tradition of decentralisation, whose evolution reflects the
changing orientation of economic and political strategy. The decentralised framework of the
Chinese economy has always been used by central authorities as the main transmission vector
of the successive economic reforms. The Maoist strategy dominated Chinese development
until 1978. T he regional development policy over the whole period reflected the various
strategies – economic as well as political - which prevailed at state level: at the beginning, the
main objective was to achieve a balanced distribution of industry and of power between
regions, whereas after 1964, the projects had few links with local economies and were based
on military-strategic considerations. All these investments followed, however, a common
redistributive logic. Two waves of decentralisation occurred in 1958 and 1970 which gave
great power to local governments with respect to regional economic development. As the
objective of the Maoist era was local self-sufficiency, the main types of industry were
duplicated in each region. The result was described as a « cellular » and encouraged localism.
With Deng Xiaoping, decentralisation remained important, but took another form, exhibiting
a radical reorientation of Mao’s policy: the central government encouraged specialisation, and
the significant growth of rich coastal regions was supposed to stimulate growth in inland
regions. The sixth and seventh  Five-Year Plans emphasised different paths in regional
development. The objective was to accelerate the development of the coastal regions. The
permanency in the Chinese economy of local governments, thus, went together with the
flexibility of their attributions; the reform program has, then, been applied logically, not only
by central government but also by local governments.
Indeed, the important point is that decentralisation thus conceived as a permanent designed
institution handled by the authorities, encouraged the development of a sufficiently large
                                                                                                                                                                                    
29 That is “a situation in which all institutions will easily fit into a coherent whole” (Lachmann, 1970, p.69).
30 In China, there is a very strong spatial hierarchy in administration and local power is really effective. There are
six layers of government hierarchy: central, provincial, prefecture, county, township and village.sphere of contractual freedom required for the move toward a market-like economy. Focusing
on two of the main reforms, that is first on the adaptation of Township and Village Enterprises
(TVEs) to market rules and to competition at the beginning of the reforms, and second on the
privatisation of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) from the mid-90s, it is possible to explain
how local governments have been the mainspring of the evolution.
The commitment of local governments to organising local business originated in the
commune system, when community governments were responsible for agricultural
production. Local governments acted consequently as industrial firms because first, their
autonomy vis-à-vis the central government is strong, and second, the fiscal reform stimulated
this kind of behaviour. One of the main implications of the mid-1980s local government
reform was to substitute a hard budget constraint for a soft budget constraint
31 for the TVEs,
managed by such governments
32. Indeed instead of government automatically appropriating
all the profits of the enterprises under their jurisdiction, the enterprises were to be taxed
according to a fixed rate (Walder, 1995); the residual, retained by the enterprises managed by
local governments, constituted a strong incentive for the former to be more profitable. With
regard to the tax revenues collected from enterprises under their jurisdiction, the reform
authorised, by another way, each level of government to turn over a contractually specific
amount to the level of government immediately above, the potential residual being kept by the
lower level. Conversely, local governments became responsible for covering shortfalls. The
different regions experimented with different systems and, consequently, a wide variety of
contracts. Even if villages were officially outside that system, they often had the strongest
incentives. Indeed, although villages had to pay a tax to the township government, all the
residual went to the village government; “the villages are treated by the township government
exactly as a private enterprise under the township would be” (Oi, quoted by Walder, 1995,
p.280). Furthermore, the reforms created the possibility of extra-budgetary funds; this
possibility constitutes a strong incentive for sub-national governments to set up a hard budget
constraint and to close the non profit firms. The idea is that the budget constraint of
enterprises can be hardened through fiscal decentralisation which gives local governments an
incentive to enter into fiscal competition. It is obvious that in China there is competition in
                                                          
31 The notion of a soft budget constraint upon which, in any planned economy, the behaviour of the enterprise is
based, refers to the idea that the government cannot credibly commit to stopping an enterprise activity because of
the losses in private benefits for workers and managers (Qian and Roland, 1996). The analysis of a soft budget
constraint generally assumes that the state is the single owner in the economy.
32 Another implication was to secure the property rights environment necessary for the development of market
transactions.infrastructure investments to attract foreign investment. For example, the campaign initiated
by the Centre to restrict investment over the period 1989-1991 had only limited effects on the
level of investment in Shanghai and Guangdong ( Li, 1997). The reason is that fiscal
competition under factor mobility increases the total marginal local value of infrastructure
investment above its marginal social value, and therefore induces more infrastructure
investments
Empirical evidence shows that, during the period of the austerity programme in 1989-90,
about three million TVEs went bankrupt or were taken over by other enterprises. All of this
confirms the fact that the local governments, which applied the central plan during the era of
Mao, adjusted themselves to the new conditions of the reform era in order to facilitate the
adoption of new market mechanisms in the Chinese economy.
Local governments also played a key role in the privatisation process of SOEs. The urgent
need for a reform of the State Owned Enterprises became evident in the mid-90s. The SOE
were owned by the central government, but they were supervised by the central, provincial,
city and county governments. The philosophy of the reform is contained in the idea: “grasping
the large and letting go the small”. The practical consequences of such an idea are as follows:
(i) the central government kept the largest enterprises, (ii) the other large enterprises were
offered to conglomerations and corporations by means of mergers, (iii) the small SOE were
privatised at county level, (iv) a mass lay-off of SOE workers appeared at the city level.
It is important to note here that local governments, after the TVE experience, initiated SOE
privatisation and consequently played a critical role in the implementation of this reform. The
central government used the provincial governments to make privatisation possible. The local
governments’ incentives are partly similar to those we met with in analysis of TVEs: the
access to a harder budget constraint and to competition
33. It played an active role in the
introduction process of market rules not only by selecting the enterprises to be privatised but
also by determining the rhythm of the reforms (Cao, Qian, Weingast, 1999). The objective
was to take into account the occurrence of regional disparities and to manage the privatisation
process through specific economic and social measures in order to compensate for the
negative effects of privatisation. For example, when Shanghai’s textile and measurement
instruments industries became non-competitive compared with  TVEs, the city chose to
organise two “re-employment service centres” in these industries. These centres are
responsible for subsistence level support for the redundant workers and for training. They arefinanced by the city government, the new textile and measurement companies and by social
sponsors
34.
Thus the TVEs, as well as the SOEs experiences, highlight the role played in China by
decentralisation. By organising the development of contractual transactions, the decentralised
institutions of the Chinese economy have indeed played a decisive role in making the planned
economic logic compatible with that, radically opposed, of a market economy. In the case of
China, decentralisation represents one of these legal institutions which authorises the
integration of changes without altering the institutional structure as a whole. Both the
originality and the success of the Chinese reforms are to be found in this aptitude to resolve
the permanency-flexibility dilemma.
Conclusion
This contribution exhibits a double dimension. From a theoretical point of view, it gave me
the opportunity to specify the outlines of a market process analysis standing in the economics
of time and ignorance. Such an analysis which explicitly takes into account the processual
dimension of both the behaviours and the forms of co-ordination is likely to offer the
analytical structure required for a general study of the co-ordination in time of the individual
plans. The institutions, as well as the other forms of co-ordination are analysed through their
contribution to a market order, that is to a harmonious running of the markets which does not
systematically square with the state of equilibrium.
From an empirical point of view it gave me the chance to demonstrate that the question of
the complementarity of the forms of co-ordination is at the heart of the development of the
market economies. The objective here is to establish, through an appropriate temporal
articulation of the different institutions, the conditions for a harmonious development of the
market processes.
                                                                                                                                                                                    
33 The reduction of transaction costs constitutes another incentive.
34 The experience of Heilongjang represents another good example. Heilongjiang is well known for its heavy
industries, of soviet type, which are no longer attractive for foreign funds. Confronted by the problem of
restructuring, the region found its own original solution. After an experiment in the coal mining sector, the
provincial government adopted the “3-3 scheme»: one third of employees would continue in their jobs, one third
would engage in new tertiary industries and one third would go to agriculture because of abundant uncultivated
land. The program was applied to the main sectors of the region and the results were successful with 16%
industrial growth in 1996.References
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